## 1NC

## Off

#### The brutalization and racialization of black populations is horrific but there is an important divergence – they were never served on a plate and eaten – the ethics of eating should be the starting point of impact calculus

PUGLIESE ’13(Joseph, Research Director, MMCCS @ Macquarie U., State Violence and the Execution of Law: Biopolitical Caesurae of Torture, Black Sites, Drones, pp. 44-45)

[gender modified]

In his profound meditation on ‘the caesura between the human and the animal’ as that which establishes the condition of possibility for the emergence of ‘the human,’ Agamben notes that the human is the result ‘of ceaseless divisions and caesurae.’48 ‘It is more urgent to work on these divisions,’ Agamben writes, ‘to ask in what way – within man – has ~~man~~ [humanity] been separated from the non-man, and the animal from the human, than it is to take positions on the great issues, on so-called human rights and values.’49 Agamben’s critical devaluation of human rights in the framework of human violence against animals has been amply theorized by a number of critics who, following Foucault, have demonstrated how rights are in fact complicit with regimes of subjugation and violent governance.50¶ In the course of her painstaking documentation of the scenes of violent subjection that mark the life and death of black slaves, Hartman, at one juncture in her narrative, cites the testimony of the slave Charlie Moses: ‘The way us niggers was treated was awful. Master would beat, knock, kick, kill. He done ever’ thing he could ’cept eat us.’51 The human master can, in other words, ‘beat, knock, kick, kill’ the animal and the slave but they cannot eat the enslaved human. Charlie Moses’ testimony evidences how the homology between human slave and enslaved animal holds right up to this interdictory limit point. The critical caesura that is evidenced here opens up the space that will enable the ‘noncriminal putting to death’ of animals by humans in order to enable humans’ ‘carno-phallogocentrism.’52 Articulated in Moses’ testimony is the biopolitical freedom to torture and kill enslaved forms of human life with absolute impunity and the attendant prohibition on eating the human-animal-slave. It is only due to this singular prohibition that Moses can inhabit, in the most radically qualified and fraught manner, the modality of the human. This intra-species prohibition functions to calibrate the human slave up one notch on the speciesist hierarchy of life. This interdiction, then, designates the only difference/division between human and animal available to the black slave. The difference between animal and human animal on the slave plantation hangs singularly on an intra-species prohibition that is animated by the most fragile of anthropocentric invocations: the only quarter granted to black slaves is to allow them a circumscribed space in which their fungibility encompasses everything but being served up as dinner on the master’s dinner table. This intra-species, anthropocentric prohibition operates as the term that cuts animals off from human animal-slaves, while articulating the entry of human slaves into a political life constituted by only one non-negotiable claim to the human: they could not be eaten.

#### Anthropocentrism is the original and foundational hierarchy that structures all other forms of oppression

**Best, 7** (Steven – Chair of Philosophy @ University of Texas – El Paso, Review of Charles Patterson’s “The Eternal Treblinka: Our Treatment of Animals and the Holocaust”, Journal for Critical Animal Studies, <http://www.drstevebest.org/EternalTriblenka.pdf>) //MD

While a welcome advance over the anthropocentric conceit that only humans shape human actions, the environmental determinism approach typically fails to emphasize the crucial role that animals play in human history, as well as how the human exploitation of animals is a key cause of hierarchy, social conflict, and environmental breakdown. A core thesis of what I call “animal standpoint theory” is that animals have been key driving and shaping forces of human thought, psychology, moral and social life, and history overall. More specifically, animal standpoint theory argues that **the oppression of human over human has deep roots in the oppression of human over animal.** ¶ In this context, Charles Patterson’s recent book, The Eternal Treblinka: Our Treatment of Animals and the Holocaust, articulates the animal standpoint in a powerful form with revolutionary implications. The main argument of Eternal Treblinka is that **the human domination of animals, such as it emerged some ten thousand years ago with the rise of agricultural society, was the first hierarchical domination and laid the groundwork for patriarchy, slavery, warfare, genocide, and other systems of violence and power.** A key implication of Patterson’s theory is that human liberation is implausible if disconnected from animal liberation, and thus humanism -- a speciesist philosophy that constructs a hierarchal relationship privileging superior humans over inferior animals and reduces animals to resources for human use -- collapses under the weight of its logical contradictions. ¶ Patterson lays out his complex holistic argument in three parts. In Part I, he demonstrates that animal exploitation and speciesism have direct and profound connections to slavery, colonialism, racism, and anti-Semitism. In Part II, he shows how these connections exist not only in the realm of ideology – as conceptual systems of justifying and underpinning domination and hierarchy – but also in systems of technology, such that the tools and techniques humans devised for the rationalized mass confinement and slaughter of animals were mobilized against human groups for the same ends. Finally, in the fascinating interviews and narratives of Part III, Patterson describes how personal experience with German Nazism prompted Jewish to take antithetical paths: whereas most retreated to an insular identity and dogmatic emphasis on the singularity of Nazi evil and its tragic experience, others recognized the profound similarities between how Nazis treated their human captives and how humanity as a whole treats other animals, an epiphany that led them to adopt vegetarianism, to become advocates for the animals, and develop a far broader and more inclusive ethic informed by universal compassion for all suffering and oppressed beings.¶ The Origins of Hierarchy¶ "As long as men massacre animals, they will kill each other" –Pythagoras¶ It is little understood that **the first form of oppression, domination, and hierarchy involves human domination over animals.** Patterson’s thesis stands in bold contrast to the Marxist theory that the domination over nature is fundamental to the domination over other humans. It differs as well from the social ecology position of Murray Bookchin that domination over humans brings about alienation from the natural world, provokes hierarchical mindsets and institutions, and is the root of the long-standing western goal to “dominate” nature. In the case of Marxists, anarchists, and so many others, theorists typically don’t even mention human domination of animals, let alone assign it causal primacy or significance. In Patterson’s model, however, the human subjugation of animals is the first form of hierarchy and it paves the way for **all other systems of domination** such as include patriarchy, racism, colonialism, anti-Semitism, and the Holocaust. As he puts it, “the exploitation of animals was the model and inspiration for the atrocities people committed against each other, slavery and the Holocaust being but two of the more dramatic examples.” ¶ Hierarchy emerged with the rise of agricultural society some ten thousand years ago. In the shift from nomadic hunting and gathering bands to settled agricultural practices, humans began to establish their dominance over animals through “domestication.” In animal domestication (often a euphemism disguising coercion and cruelty), humans began to exploit animals for purposes such as obtaining food, milk, clothing, plowing, and transportation. As they gained increasing control over the lives and labor power of animals, humans bred them for desired traits and controlled them in various ways, such as castrating males to make them more docile. To conquer, enslave, and claim animals as their own property, humans developed numerous technologies, such as pens, cages, collars, ropes, chains, and branding irons. The domination of animals paved the way for the domination of humans. The sexual subjugation of women, Patterson suggests, was modeled after the domestication of animals, such that men began to control women’s reproductive capacity, to enforce repressive sexual norms, and to rape them as they forced breeding in their animals. Not coincidentally, Patterson argues, slavery emerged in the same region of the Middle East that spawned agriculture, and, in fact, developed as an extension of animal domestication practices. In areas like Sumer, slaves were managed like livestock, and males were castrated and forced to work along with females. ¶ In the fifteenth century, **when Europeans began the colonization of Africa and Spain introduced the first international slave markets, the metaphors, models, and technologies used to exploit animal slaves were applied with equal cruelty and force to human slaves.** Stealing Africans from their native environment and homeland, breaking up families who scream in anguish, wrapping chains around slaves’ bodies, shipping them in cramped quarters across continents for weeks or months with no regard for their needs or suffering, branding their skin with a hot iron to mark them as property, auctioning them as servants, breeding them for service and labor, exploiting them for profit, beating them in rages of hatred and anger, and killing them in vast numbers – all these horrors and countless others inflicted on black slaves were developed and perfected centuries earlier through animal exploitation. ¶ As the domestication of animals developed in agricultural society, humans lost the intimate connections they once had with animals. By the time of Aristotle, certainly, and with the bigoted assistance of medieval theologians such as St. Augustine and Thomas Aquinas, western humanity had developed an explicitly hierarchical worldview – that came to be known as the “Great Chain of Being” – used to position humans as the end to which all other beings were mere means. ¶ Patterson underscores the crucial point that the domination of human over human and its exercise through slavery, warfare, and genocide typically begins with the denigration of victims. But the means and methods of dehumanization are derivative, for **speciesism provided the conceptual paradigm that encouraged, sustained, and justified western brutality toward other peoples.** “Throughout the history of our ascent to dominance as the master species,” Patterson writes, “our victimization of animals has served as the model and foundation for our victimization of each other. The study of human history reveals the pattern: first, humans exploit and slaughter animals; then, they treat other people like animals and do the same to them.” Whether the conquerors are European imperialists, American colonialists, or German Nazis, western aggressors engaged in wordplay before swordplay, vilifying their victims – Africans, Native Americans, Filipinos, Japanese, Vietnamese, Iraqis, and other unfortunates – with opprobrious terms such as “rats,” “pigs,” “swine,” “monkeys,” “beasts,” and “filthy animals.” ¶ Once perceived as brute beasts or sub-humans occupying a lower evolutionary rung than white westerners, subjugated peoples were treated accordingly; once characterized as animals, they could be hunted down like animals. The first exiles from the moral community, animals provided a convenient discard bin for oppressors to dispose the oppressed. The connections are clear: “For a civilization built on the exploitation and slaughter of animals, the `lower’ and more degraded the human victims are, the easier it is to kill them.” Thus, colonialism, as Patterson describes, was a “natural extension of human supremacy over the animal kingdom.” For just as humans had subdued animals with their superior intelligence and technologies, so many Europeans believed that the white race had proven its superiority by bringing the “lower races” under its command. ¶ There are important parallels between speciesism and sexism and racism in the elevation of white male rationality to the touchstone of moral worth. The arguments European colonialists used to legitimate exploiting Africans – that they were less than human and inferior to white Europeans in ability to reason – are the very same justifications humans use to trap, hunt, confine, and kill animals. Once western norms of rationality were defined as the essence of humanity and social normality, by first using non-human animals as the measure of alterity, it was a short step to begin viewing odd, different, exotic, and eccentric peoples and types as non- or sub-human. Thus, the same criterion created to exclude animals from humans was also used to ostracize blacks, women, and numerous other groups from “humanity.” The oppression of blacks, women, and animals alike was grounded in an argument that biological inferiority predestined them for servitude. In the major strain of western thought, alleged rational beings (i.e., elite, white, western males) pronounce that the Other (i.e., women, people of color, animals) is deficient in rationality in ways crucial to their nature and status, and therefore are deemed and treated as inferior, subhuman, or nonhuman. Whereas the racist mindset creates a hierarchy of superior/inferior on the basis of skin color, and the sexist mentality splits men and women into greater and lower classes of beings, the speciesist outlook demeans and objectifies animals by dichotomizing the biological continuum into the antipodes of humans and animals. As racism stems from a hateful white supremacism, and sexism is the product of a bigoted male supremacism, so speciesism stems from and informs a violent human supremacism -- namely, the arrogant belief that humans have a natural or God-given right to use animals for any purpose they devise or, more generously, within the moral boundaries of welfarism and stewardship, which however was Judaic moral baggage official Christianity left behind.¶

#### Our countermethodology is to write in the place of the animals that die – this process of forefronting the positionality of the animal is necessary to promote ethical self-reflexivity – the role of the ballot is to move towards a true political space

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(Rosemary-Claire, “Apocalypse Meow”, Capitalism Nature Socialism, 24:1, 35-41, dml)

‘‘A true political space,’’ writes Swyngedouw (2010b, 194), ‘‘is always a space of contestation for those who are not-all, who are uncounted and unnamed.’’ This true political space necessarily includes\*if only by virtue of their exclusion\*animals, the ‘‘constitutive outside’’ of humanity itself. How we respond to this dynamic ought to be a central question of critical scholarship and philosophizing. To be a philosopher, says Deleuze in the ‘‘A for Animal’’ entry to the ‘‘abecedary’’ (L’abe´ce´daire de Gilles Deleuze 1989), ‘‘is to write in the place of animals that die.’’ This is still an imperfect way of describing my objective (for one thing, I am also interested in animals that are still alive), but it is an improvement over being a ‘‘spokesperson’’ for animals, which are often characterized as speechless and may be rendered more so having spokespeople appointed to speak on their behalf. To write in the place of animals that die seems a preferable, though still fraught, characterization.¶ This paper is therefore written in the place of those uncounted and unnamed non-subjects of political space, the animals that die, the nonhumans, the hundreds of millions of animals that are ‘‘living out our nightmares’’ (Raffles 2010, 120): injected, tested, prodded, then discarded. We have denied, disavowed, and misunderstood animals. They are refused speech, reason, morality, emotion, clothing, shelter, mourning, culture, lying, lying about lying, gifting, laughing, crying\*the list has no limit. But ‘‘who was born first, before the names?’’ Derrida (2008, 18) asks. ‘‘Which one saw the other come to this place, so long ago? Who will have been the first occupant? Who the subject? Who has remained the despot, for so long now?’’ Some see identifying this denial as a side-event, inconsequential, even sort of silly. The belief in human superiority is firmly lodged and dear to people’s hearts and senses of themselves. It also seems a daunting task, not a simple matter of inserting the excluded into the dominant political order, which as Z ˇ izˇek (1999) writes, neglects how these very subversions and exclusions are the order’s condition of being.

## Case

#### The aff is a sentimental politics which promises an empathetic identification will suddenly reshape the debate community and the world through the actualization of an ethics of care – they imagine their presentation of experience as a prophylactic against the resurgence of violence which ignores that liberal moralism is the motor of modern oppression – they call on victims to bargain for a more just world by exposing their wounds for academic consumption – this act of politicization relies on a victim economy where bodies are forced to dance for an infinitely deferred freedom – this vampirically drains the oppressed of life while extracting jouissance and institutional advancement for academics

Berlant 1998

/Lauren, George M. Pullman Professor, Department of English, University of Chicago, “Poor Eliza,” *American Literature*, Vol. 70, No. 3, No More Separate Spheres! (Sep., 1998), Duke University Press, pg. 635-668/

What distinguishes these … of the stereotypical image.

#### This process of appropriation through empathetic identification with the other is the root cause of colonial violence

Waldenfels 1995

/Bernhard, professor of philosophy at Ruhr University in Bochum, Germany, “Response to the Other,” in The Psychology of Human Possibility and Constraint: Studies in Literature, History, and Culture, google books, 37-8/

It has often been … **appropriation of the world**.

#### Love is property—it is is the drive for appropriation of the other

**Derrida, 97** Visiting Professor at NYU, 1997 [Jacques, Politics of Friendship, p. 64-65]

This 'disappropriation' [dépropriation] would undoubtedly beckon to this other 'love' whose true name, says Nietzsche in conclusion, whose 'just name' is friendship (Ihr rechter Name ist Freundschaft).16 This friendship is a species of love, but of a love more loving than love. All the names would have to change for the sake of coherence. Without being able to devote to it the careful reading it deserves, let us recall that this little two-page treatise on love denounces, in sum, the right to property. **This property right is the claim** [revendication] **of love** (at least, of what is thus named). The vindictive claim of this right can be deciphered throughout all the **appropriative manoeuvres** of the strategy which this 'love' deploys. It is the appropriating drive (Trieb) par excellence. **'Love' wants to possess**. It wants the possessing. It is the possessing — cupidity itself (Habsucht); it always hopes for new property; and even the very Christian 'love of one's neighbour' — charity, perhaps — would reveal only a new lust in this fundamental drive**: 'Our love of our neighbour — is it not a lust for new possessions?** (Unsere Nächstenliebe - ist sie nicht ein drang each rituals Eigentum?)'

This question is doubly important. In contesting the Christian revolution of love as much as the Greek philosophical concept of friendship — and just as much the norms of justice that depend on them — its target is the very value of proximity, **the neighbour's proximity as the ruse of the proper and of appropriation**. The gesture confirms the warning accompanying the discourse on 'good friendship': not to give in to proximity or identification, to the fusion or the permutation of you and me. But, rather to place, maintain or **keep an infinite distance within 'good friendship'.** The very thing that love — that which is thus named, 'love between the sexes', egotism itself, jealousy which tends only towards possession (Besitzen) - is **incapable of doing**.

Is this to say that friendship, rightly named, will carry itself beyond Eros? Beyond Eros in general? Or beyond love between two sexes?

Nietzsche does not unfold these questions in this form. But let us not conceal their radicality, which can become disquieting, particularly given the motive of the 'new' or of the 'future' that we perhaps too often trust as if it were univocal, simply opposed to the form of repetition and the work of the arch-ancient. For Nietzsche sees this drive of appropriation, this form always pushing for 'new property', at work everywhere, including where love loves in view of knowledge, of truth, of the novelty of the new, of all new reality in general: 'Our love of our neighbour — is it not a lust for new possessions? And likewise our love of knowledge, of truth, and altogether any lust for what is new? (und uberhaupt all fetter Drang nab Neuigkeiten?)'

#### Love reproduces a western valuation of property and intimate possession; an ethics of love reduces any of loves radical potential to banal television selling us a newer, better life

Belsey, 94 Centre for Critical and Cultural Theory, 1994 [Catherine, “Postmodern Love: Questioning the Metaphysics of Desire,” New Literary History 25.3: 683-705, jstor, p. 683-687]

CAN’T BUY ME LOVE.

To the degree that the postmodern condition implies an unbridled consumerism, the cultural logic of late capitalism, pleasure for cash, and a product to gratify every possible impulse-if not, indeed, to construct the impulse in the first place-love is a value that remains beyond the market. While sex is a commodity, love becomes the condition of a happiness that cannot be bought, the one remaining object of a desire that cannot be sure of purchasing fulfillment. Love thus becomes more precious than before because it is beyond price, and in consequence its metaphysical character is intensified. More than ever, love has come to represent presence, transcendence, immortality, what Jacques Derrida calls proximity, living speech,' certainty-everything, in short, that the market is unable to provide or fails to guarantee.

To the degree, however, that postmodernity in general, and Derrida's work in particular, also represents a skeptical attitude to metaphysics, a radical questioning of presence, transcendence, certainty, and all absolutes, the postmodern condition brings with it an incredulity toward true love. Where, we might ask, in the light of our experience, the statistics, our philosophy, or any documentary evidence outside popular romance, are its guarantees, its continuities, proof of its ability to fulfill its undertakings?

At the same time, no amount of skepticism does away with desire which, if it is the destiny of a signifying organism, is fashioned, but neither produced nor erased, by the specific cultural order which gives rise to our doubts. Love thus occupies a paradoxical position in postmodern culture: it is at once infinitely and uniquely desirable on the one hand, and conspicuously naive on the other. Like the writer of Derrida's postcards, we know exactly the opposite of what we desire, of what we know our desire to be (PC 194).

When Ferdinand de Saussure drew attention to the problem of translation, he enabled his readers to recognize the inevitability of cultural difference and the impossibility of legislating for its resolution. Words, Saussure pointed out, do not necessarily have exact equivalents from one language to another. As any practicing translator knows, not only nuances but pronouns, genders, tenses, and distinctions can be untranslatable.2 It follows that meanings are not held in place by objects in the world, or by concepts independent of language. The signified (meaning) resides in language or, more broadly, in signifying systems (including visual images, for instance) and it is to be found nowhere else. Signification is differential, but the differences are not guaranteed by the world or by ideas. The world may be encountered as resistance, but it cannot be known outside the systems of differences which define it. Ideas are an effect of difference, not its cause. They are, moreover, deferred by the signifier which produces them. Differed and deferred, supplanted, relegated by the signifier, the signified has no autonomy, no substance.

There is thus no guarantee that our linguistic, signifying, differential cognitive maps are accurate. We cannot think, argue, reason, dispute, or know outside the differences that precede our entry into the cultural order, and which, therefore, we have learned from it in the first place. This does not mean that we make everything up, or that whatever we happen to believe is equally plausible, equally valid. If I believe I can fly, I am likely to encounter the world as resistance. ... It does mean, however, that we cannot guarantee the positive content of what we know by pointing to some extralinguistic ground of certainty. Certainty itself exists only in the language that is invoked to justify it. Nor does it mean that nothing changes. On the contrary, knowledges collide and clash, producing alternative forms of understanding; resistances generate new developments; refutations efface old convictions. But the possession of truth is not an option.

The Enlightenment took a judicial stand on cultural difference. It assessed and weighed the meanings and values taken for truth in different cultures and found many of them wanting-primitive, irrational, or unscientific. But while it repudiated fundamentalisms of all kinds, it participated nevertheless in another kind of metaphysics by laying claim to a place from which to assess and weigh and judge. That place, which was held to be independent, objective, precisely "enlightened," now seems as culturally relative as the judgments themselves, and from a postmodern perspective this ultimate complacency of the Enlightenment, however well intentioned, has come to look like the last infirmity of noble minds.

Or worse. Because truth is a legislator, and it has imposed its values on all those who have had a more restricted access to it, who have not been entitled to act as its guarantors-the working class, the non- Western world, women. As palpably as any fundamentalism (if less spectacularly), middle-class, white, patriarchal truth has legitimated exclusions, oppressions, and violence; it has justified appropriation, damage, and destruction.

And true love, too, itself another kind of fundamentalism, has legalized prohibitions, coercions, narrow proprieties, expropriations, and the transformation of people into property. With the best of intentions, the metaphysical ideal of true love, and the concomitant efforts of the modern Western world to confine and contain desire within the legality of marriage, have produced, we are now in a position to acknowledge, at best a lifetime of surveillance and self-surveillance for the couple in question, and at worst the perfect opportunity for domestic violence and child abuse, concealed within the privacy of the nuclear family.

II

Love is thus at once endlessly pursued and ceaselessly suspected. Can such a paradoxical value speak or be spoken? Desired as the ultimate good, feared as constraint, doubted as an illusion, postmodern love is both silent and garrulous. It cannot speak, and yet it seems that it never ceases to speak in late twentieth-century Western culture.

It is silent, first, in recognition of its **deep banality**. "Every other night, on TV," Roland Barthes points out, "someone says: I love you."3 How can we, unique and autonomous as we long to be, capture the extraordinary experience of desire in the repetition of this worn-out commonplace, this blank performative, which lacks nuances and "suppresses explanations, adjustments, degrees, scruples"? (LD 148). "I love you" obliterates the difference, the uniqueness of the desire it sets out to capture, and affirms the difference it sets out to efface, the

## 2NC

THE QUESTION OF IMPACT CALCULUS IS ABSOLUTE – ONLY THE HUMAN DIES BUT THE ANIMAL MERELY PERISHES TO UNMARKED GRAVES – THE GRATUITOUS VIOLENCE ENACTED UPON THE ANIMAL BODY FUNCTIONS AS A FORM OF ONTOLOGICAL DECATEGORIZATION THAT TRANSMUTES IT INTO THE NON-BODY

Pugliese, 13 (Joseph Pugliese – Associate Professor of Cultural Studies at Macquarie University specializing in social justice, "State Violence and the Execution of Law: Biopolitical Caesurae of Torture, Black Sites,” 2013, pg. pg. 167-70, gender modified) //MD

The CIA black site in which Rahman is held captive is not the prison-house of the human. Rather, it is the death chamber of the object-thing whose ‘being for the captor’ is a being toward death. As a being toward death, the object-thing becomes carcass. The moment of capture enunciates the crossing of the threshold into the horror of Spillers’ vestibule, a crossing that will strip the subject of every ontological, metaphysical and legal claim to the category of the ‘human.’ Entry into the vestibule of black site prisons marks the death of the subject and the birth of the object-thing. The crossing of the threshold instantiates the biopolitical cut that will divide subject from object, human from animal. Once incarcerated and suspended in the vestibule of the Salt Pit, Rahman becomes a mere carcass, ‘a kind of absolute biopolitical substance.’25 The flesh held captive within these prisons becomes, in Fanon’s haunting words, an ‘object in the midst of other objects’26 – the cell, the shackles, the instruments of torture. A type of violent paradox configures the captive flesh of the victims: within the political economy of torture, everything pivots on the body: what can be done to it, how it can be violently rendered, and what can be extracted from it. Yet, at the same time, the somatechnologies 27 of torture work to nullify the body as ‘human body’; they trans- mute it into a corpus nullius; a non-body that is merely animal carcass. The term ‘carcass’ graphically embodies what Spillers describes as ‘the theft of the dynamic principle of the living that distinguishes the subject from his/her objectification.’28 The conversion of a subject into a captive object evacuates agency, ‘the dynamic principle of the living,’ by liquidating relations of power. ‘There cannot be rela-tions of power unless subjects are free,’ notes Foucault. ‘If one were completely at the disposition of the other and became his [/her] thing, an object on which he [/she] can exercise an infinite and unlimited violence, there would not be relations of power. In order to exercise a relation of power, there must be on both sides at least a certain form of liberty.’29 In Rahman’s case, the ‘theft of the dynamic principle of the living,’ the exercise of unlimited violence on his [/her] person as a captive object, and the absence of any relations of power all ensure his transmutation into carcass.¶ I deploy the uncompromising term ‘carcass’ in order to disrupt the hold of residual humanisms that would demand of the victim, who has been stripped of every possible vestige of personhood, the exercise of some redemptive agency in the face of the most horrific of situations. This demand works to reassure the privileged Western subject confronted by a site of utter subjection that something ‘human’ remains in the face of the horror that lies entirely on the hither side of their own ontological ground, even as they are structurally complicit in the production of the violence that they abhor; even as their status as human-rights- bearing subjects is predicated on the human-animal other than can be killed without punishment – as was the case in the killing of Gul Rahman. To demand and extract agency from the victims of fatal torture regimes would be tantamount to inflicting upon them yet another level of (symbolic) violence, by imposing upon them a redemptive narrative that is undone at every turn by their torture, death and unceremonious dispatch to unmarked graves. Situated in this context, carcass signifies the transmutation of the human subject into torture’s object-thing. Carcass is that object-thing that will not be liberated or redeemed and for whom, as in Gul Rahman’s case, no justice will be served. Carcass is the term for captive flesh that experiences useless suffering unto death. The useless suffering of the captive body tortured unto death is ‘intrinsically meaningless and condemned to itself without exit.’30 The dead tortured body is worthless to the captors as they can no longer hope to extract even a modicum of intelligence from their captive flesh. Without exit, immured within the totality of a black site, useless suffering implodes the subject, destroying all the sentient categories constitutive of the unitary and affective human subject through unassumable, unbearable levels of pain destined to produce that fatal animal remnant: the carcass.¶ As the product of the biopolitical caesura, the figure of the carcass enables me to begin to account for what would otherwise continue to remain inexplicable: how is it that the hundreds of thousands of Iraqi, Afghan and Pakistani civilians that have died in the course of the war on terror fail to register in the West as deaths as such? What inviolable asymmetry divides these deaths from the Western deaths at the hands of terror that are grieved, mourned and memorialized as individuated and singular ‘first deaths’? The biopolitical caesura, through its human/ animal division, renders all those civilians killed by the West in the course of the war on terror as so many animal carcasses that, in effect, do not die but merely perish. Inscribing this Western production of human carcasses from the Global South is the metaphysics of a virulent (racio-) anthropocentrism that finds its clinical articulation in Heidegger. For Heidegger, ‘the animal,’ because it is defined by a fundamental series of privations and captivations, ‘cannot die in the sense in which dying is ascribed to human beings but can only come to an end.’31 ‘To die,’ Heidegger elaborates, ‘means to be capable of death as death. Only ~~man dies~~ [the human dies]. The animal perishes.’32 The violent operations of racio-speciesism render the subjects of the Global South as non-human animals captivated in their lawlessness and inhuman savagery and deficient in everything that defines the human-rights-bearing subject. In contradistinction to the individuating singularity of the Western subject as named person, they embody the anonymous genericity of the animal and the seriality of the undifferentiated and replaceable carcass. As subjects incapable of embodying the figure of ‘the human,’ they are animals who, when killed by torture or drone attacks, do not die but only come to an end. In a Western context, what remains is the carcass that is not worthy of mourning and that, as carcass that merely perishes, need not be taken into account as a human death – regardless of the unjust death that has been visited upon it. In the case of Gul Rahman, even the minimal remainder of the carcass is disappeared and his family are left with no body, no bones, no ashes, but only an intangible spectre encrypted in a legal footnote.¶ In order to contest this racio-anthropocentric erasure and nulliﬁcation of Global South deaths that have resulted from the war on terror, I invoke a Levinasian ethics of mourning: ‘In the death of another . . . it is not the passage from one quiddity to another that is announced; in death is the very event of passing . . . with its own acuteness that is its scandal (each death is the ﬁrst death).’ 33 In focusing on the singularity of Gul Rahman’s death, I have attempted to re-situate his passing not as a mere perishing but as a death with its own acute- ness that is its scandal. I hope, thereby, to have reclaimed his death as precisely a ﬁrst death. In the US black site prisons, Spillers’ ‘being for the captor’ is thanatologically circumscribed and temporally delimited. The captive victim can only be for the captor for the duration that his or her body can hold out against the assaults and trauma of torture. As I discussed in the Introduction, the production of the tortured carcass in these black sites is generated by inﬂicting upon the detainee two intersecting modalities of violence: instrumental and gratuitous. Instrumental violence is enabled by a battery of somatechnical instrumentalities – loudspeakers, shackles, electrical wires, cables – that are mobilized by the interrogator in the lived theatre of torture. These instruments of torture evidence the direct application of violence upon the body of the victim. Working in tandem with this instru- mental violence is gratuitous violence. Gratuitous violence operates indirectly on the body of the captive. As a torture practice, it is succinctly summed up in the slogan ‘No Blood No Foul.’ This slogan was posted on placards in US camps such as Nama, in Baghdad, Iraq, and it referred to ‘the notion, described by a Pentagon official, that “If you don’t make them bleed, they can’t prosecute you for it.” ’ 34 Among other things, gratuitous violence is what is enabled by the necropolitical architecture and ecology of these cellular black sites: total darkness, damp concrete ﬂoors and freezing cold brick walls. The gratuitous violence enabled by this necro-political matrix ensures that the detainee is entrapped within an ensemble of power relations that Foucault terms ‘unlivable’: these power relations generate a situation ‘which can’t be lived through.’ 35

## 1NR

The AFF is a form of empathetic identification which is a process of deathmaking which ensures the smooth functioning of imperialism. The AFF’s fantasy of change through investment in the law shields criticism and guises violence.

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/Lauren, George M. Pullman Professor, Department of English, University of Chicago, “The Subject of True Feeling: Pain, Privacy and Politics” in Cultural Pluralism, Identity Politics and the Law ed. Sarat & Kearns, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, Pg. 49-54/

Ravaged wages and … the hegemonic field.9